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Abstract 
This document presents the preliminary findings from the quantitative data generation and analysis 
conducted as part of the project “Financial decision-making, gender and social norms in Zambia”. 
Using a series of specially designed behavioural experiments, we generated an extensive set of insights 
into the normative environment within which spouses in Eastern Province, Zambia, make decisions 
about individual money holding and saving. Here are some of those insights. Spouses in Eastern 
Province, Zambia, are willing to compromise household-level earnings in order to maintain individual 
control over money. Wives, but not husbands, are more likely to compromise household-level 
earnings in order to maintain individual control over money, when they can keep that money and their 
actions hidden from their spouses. Individually-held behavioural prescriptions, i.e., the “shoulds” and 
“oughts” that individuals have in mind and reference as guides for their own behaviour and as 
benchmarks against which to evaluate others’ behaviour, inform decision-making about maintaining 
individual control over money at a cost to the household. Further, when individuals know that their 
spouses will find out about their descisions regarding maintaining individual control over money (or 
not) at a cost to the household, the individuals take their spouses’ opinions about what they should 
do into account, i.e., they compromise. There is strong but not unequivocal evidence pointing to the 
existence of a social norm, i.e., a “should” or “ought” that is collectively held and enforced by 
members of a community, forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouse, with the secrecy not the 
saving being the problem. Assuming it exists, this social norm forbidding saving in secret from one’s 
spouse applies to both husbands and wives, and this is acknowledged by both husbands and wives. 
However, the extent to which violations of this norm are tolerated depends on who is doing the 
violating and who the evaluating. In patrilineal communities (as compared to matrilineal 
communities), both husbands and wives are especially intolerant of secret saving by husbands and in 
both patrilineal and matrilineal communities, wives are less tolerant than husbands of secret saving 
by husbands and more tolerant than husbands of secret saving by wives. This relative tolerance of 
secret saving by wives notwithstanding, just under one in three wives and one in six husbands think 
that a man is justified in beating his wife if he discovers that she is saving in an e-wallet or has joined 
a savings group without his knowledge and, as grounds for wife beating, saving in secret is on a par 
with neglecting the children, visiting friends or family in secret and refusing to have sex. For further 
insights, see the main text of the report.  
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I. Introduction 
The aims of this project are to investigate the social norms that guide and constrain the financial 
decision-making of Zambian men and women, and to explore ways of incorporating knowledge about 
these norms into financial services, financial literacy programmes and policy design. In this report, we 
present the findings from the first part of the project, within which we used quantitative methods to 
address a pre-defined set of research questions. During the second part of the project (yet to be 
undertaken) we plan to initiate stakeholder discussions about how best to incorporate the knowledge 
into the designs of financial services, financial literacy programmes and other complementary 
interventions. Discussing the findings with communities such as those that participated in the data 
generating activities will be an important part of this, but so too will be presentations to and 
discussions with representatives from both for-profit and non-profit financial service providers, 
advocates for the expansion of financial inclusion, policy makers and regulators.     
Using recently developed methods drawn from behavioural and experimental economics, especially 
adapted for this project, we planned to identify the content of a range of social norms relating to 
money holding, money use and money management and quantify the strength of those social norms.  
By the content of a social norm, we mean the socially prescribed behaviour for an individual facing a 
particular set of behavioural choices. The strength of a social norm can be defined as the speed with 
which social approval declines as an individual’s chosen behaviour moves away from the behavioural 
prescription. However, it can also be defined with reference to the likelihood of or severity with which 
an individual who deviates from the behavioural prescription is punished. Finally, it can be defined 
with reference to the strength of the correlation between the behavioural prescription and actual 
behaviour. Drawing on the conceptual framework proposed by Bicchieri (2006), we planned to 
investigate all three of these types of norm strength and how they relate one to another, while 
focusing specifically on financial-decision-making-relevant social norms. 
Our specially adapted methods also facilitated the measurement of individually held behavioural 
prescriptions relating to financial decision-making and this turned out to be very important as the data 
we gathered indicates that:  
- financial decision-making by Zambian men and women is guided and constrained by social 
norms to a lesser extent than we originally expected; and 
- individually held behavioural prescriptions and differences in such prescriptions between 
spouses may have important implications for the decisions they make.    
We also planned to investigate the extent to which financial-decision-making-relevant social norms 
are gender specific and whether the social norms that women acknowledge as guides to the way that 
they should behave differ from the social norms that men think should be guiding women’s behaviour 
and vice-versa. Here, with regard to the one social norm that was clearly identified in our data, we 
found that the content of the norm was not gender specific, but that deviations from the norm by 
husbands where tolerated less than deviations by wives, especially by wives. With regard to 
individually held behavioural prescriptions, we found marked differences between the genders in 
terms of both what each thought that they themselves should do and what each thought the other 
should do.  
Finally, we planned to investigate whether financial-decision-making-relevant social norms vary across 
ethnic groups (tribal groupings within the Zambian context). Here, we focused on the Ngoni, who are 
traditionally patrilineal, and the Chewa, who are traditionally matrilineal. We found no evidence of 
differences in the content of financial-decision-making-relevant social norms and individually held 
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behavioural prescriptions between the two ethnic groups. However, we did find some significant 
differences in the extent to which deviations from those norms and prescriptions are tolerated. 
There are many reasons why an individual’s behaviour might deviate from a social norm. Most notably 
it may be individually sub-optimal to adhere to a social norm. If this is the case, the individual might 
choose to deviate from the norm when they can hide their actions and adhere to the norm when they 
cannot. Further, they might be willing to compromise economic efficiency in order to generate and 
take advantage of opportunities to hide their actions, i.e., they may be willing to divert effort and 
resources away from more productive activities in order to increase the chances of keeping norm-
violations hidden.    
Within the context of a household, even in the absence of gender differentiated social norms, if there 
are differences in individually held behavioural prescriptions between husbands and wives, those 
husbands and wives might be willing to compromise household-level economic efficiency in order to 
generate and take advantage of opportunities to hide their actions. Specifically, if a wife (husband) 
knows what her husband (his wife) thinks she (he) should do, but disagrees, she (he) might be willing 
to compromise household-level economic efficiency in order to generate and take advantage of 
opportunities to do as she (he) wishes without her husband (his wife) knowing.  
When, in the interests of economic development, we wish to facilitate behavioural change, it is 
important to know what is guiding and constraining individual behaviour. If social norms are guiding 
and constraining behaviour, social norms need to be changed. This can be difficult because social 
norms tend to be held in place by multiple mechanisms. An individual deviates from a social norm 
and, if he or she has internalised the norm, feels guilt. An individual deviates from a social norm and 
feels ashamed owing to social disapproval, either imagined or expressed by other members of her or 
his society. An individual deviates from a social norm and is punished, materially, physically or 
psychologically, by other members of her or his society. To change a social norm and, hence, remove 
it as a constraint on individual behaviour, one needs to address each of these mechanisms, and this 
involves working with the entire or a large part of the society to which the norm belongs. In contrast, 
while an individual who deviates from a behavioural prescription that they hold and that pertains to 
their own behaviour might feel guilt, he or she is not disapproved of or punished by other members 
of her or his society. So, only one mechanism needs to be addressed and there is no need to work with 
entire or large parts of societies. This renders individually held behavioural prescriptions easier to 
change. Finally, an individual who deviates from a behavioural prescription that an important other in 
her or his life, e.g., her or his spouse, holds might be disapproved of or punished by that other, but 
will not experience guilt. In this case, successful behaviour-changing interventions need to be directed 
at both those whose behaviour we wish to change and those whose individually held behavioural 
prescriptions need to be changed, but the diversity of views within both individuals’ society (or 
societies) can be used to facilitate such change. Development practitioners in possession of knowledge 
about what is guiding and constraining individual behaviour can design services and interventions that 
support sustainable behaviour change and do not lead to unintended consequences, especially for the 
disempowered.    
In this report, we set out our findings from the quantitative data generation conducted in July-August 
2019 and the subsequent analysis of that data. The findings reported below are preliminary in the 
sense that there is more to be done that could generate further insights. This notwithstanding, the 
findings are comprehensive in the sense that they address all of the questions we set out in our 
proposal and have been subjected to an extensive range of scientific robustness checks. 
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The report is structured as follows: Section II presents the research agenda that we set out prior to 
collecting our data; Section III describes the methods we used to generate our data (III.i), our sample 
design (III.ii), and our analytical methods (III.iii); and Section IV presents our data analysis and results.  
 
II. Quantitative research agenda 
By engaging a sample of Zambian women and men in a series of incentivised tasks, i.e., tasks for which 
they would be paid, with the amount they were paid being dependent on the decisions that they and 
others made during the tasks, we planned to address the following questions: 
1. Are spouses in Zambia willing to compromise household economic efficiency in order to 
maintain individual control over money?  
2. Specifically, when given the opportunity to do so, do spouses hide money from each other 
even when hiding is costly? 
3. Are wives and husbands differentially inclined to incur costs with the aim of hiding and, 
thereby, maintaining individual control over money?  
4. Are the decisions made by spouses about money hiding, money holding, and money and 
financial service use informed by social norms about who within households should hold and 
make decisions about money? 
5. Specifically, if a wife chooses to hold and make independent decisions about money and 
financial service use, is she violating a norm? 
6. Do the social norms that women acknowledge as guides to the way they should behave differ 
from the social norms that men think should be guiding women’s behaviour (and vice-versa)?  
7. Do social norms about who within a household is supposed to hold and make decisions about 
money vary systematically depending on whether a community is matrilineal or patrilineal? 
Based on the findings of previous studies undertaken outside Zambia (see, for example, Ashraf (2009), 
Iversen et al (2011), Kebede et al (2014), Jakiele and Ozier (2016), Almås et al (2018) and Barr et al 
(2019)), we expected the answers to questions 1 to 3 to be “yes”. However, it was important to 
establish whether and to what extent these findings replicate in Zambia as they related directly to the 
conceptual foundation upon which we build.  
Studies addressing questions 4 to 7 are extremely rare. Based on Afzal et al (2016), discussions taking 
place during webinars focusing on financial inclusion and women’s empowerment around the time 
when we were formulating our research questions, and preliminary discussions with women in 
Zambia, we expected the answers to questions 4 to 7 to be “yes” as well. However, in the interests of 
scientific rigor, we allowed for the answers to these questions to be “no” and ensured that our 
research methods would allow us to investigate, not only social norms but also individually held 
behavioural prescriptions, whether and how they differ between women and men and matrilineal and 
patrilineal communities and how they impact on decision-making.  
 
III. Quantitative research methods 
III.i Data generation methods 
The Allocation Task (AT): At the core of our quantitative research design was an adaptation of the 
incentivised task designed by Almås et al (2018). Within our version of the task wives and husbands 
had to make a series of eleven decisions about whether a sum of money should be placed in their own 
hands or in the hands of their spouse. Within each husband-wife couple taking part in the study, one 
 9 
 
spouse was randomly picked to be the decision-maker (DM), while the other spouse was passive (PS). 
The DM was guided through the task under carefully controlled conditions. Most importantly, the DM 
and PS were not allowed to discuss the task before the DM made her/his decisions and the PS only 
found out about the task and, in one treatment, the decisions made by his/her spouse after the latter 
had completed the task.  
Each DM started the task by choosing either K45 to self or K45 to spouse (referred to below as the 
45:45 decision),5 and then worked through a further ten decisions designed to quantify her/his 
willingness to pay to have an amount of money in either her/his own or her/his spouse’s possession. 
The further ten decisions were: K40 to self or K45 to spouse (the 40:45 decision); K35 to self or K45 to 
spouse (the 35:45 decision); K30 to self or K45 to spouse (the 30:45 decision); K25 to self or K45 to 
spouse (the 25:45 decision); K20 to self or K45 to spouse (the 20:45 decision); K15 to self or K45 to 
spouse (the 15:45 decision); K10 to self or K45 to spouse (the 10:45 decision); K5 to self or K45 to 
spouse (the 5:45 decision); zero to self or K45 to spouse (the 0:45 decision); and K45 to self or K40 to 
spouse (the 45:40 decision). Once a DM had completed all eleven decisions, they rolled a die to 
establish which, if any, would be used to determine their own and their spouses’ earnings from the 
task. 
Each DM was randomly assigned to one of two treatments, either the Zero Deniability Treatment or 
the High Deniability Treatment. Under the Zero Deniability Treatment each PS (later) learned about 
the decisions made by his/her DM spouse and the DM knew that this would happen before making 
his/her decisions. Under the High Deniability Treatment, the PSs received their payoff, if one was due, 
but the specifics of the treatment ensured that they learnt nothing (or, in a few cases, very little)6 
about the decisions made by their DM spouses. 
The decisions the DMs took in this task inform us about their willingness to compromise household 
efficiency in order to maintain individual control over money (see research question 1). Comparing 
decisions across treatment arms revealed their preferences regarding the use of opportunities to hide 
money (see research question 2) and comparing wives’ and husbands’ decisions under the two 
treatments allowed us to investigate gender differences in these preferences and behaviours (see 
research question 3).   
The Evaluation Task Part 1 (ET1): Using survey questions and methods originally proposed by Burks 
and Krupka (2012) and Krupka and Weber (2013), we set out to identify the content and strength of 
the individually held behavioural prescriptions and social norms that pertain to the AT within each of 
the communities in which husbands and wives participated in the AT. It is important to note that we 
were not assuming that individuals and communities have pre-formed individual prescriptions and 
social norms relating specifically to the task. Rather, we were assuming that they would have 
individual prescriptions and social norms pertaining to money holding and use by wives and husbands 
and would be adept at spotting the relevance of and applying these prescriptions and norms to 
emergent decision-making contexts. 
 
5 In the original design, the first AT decision was K50 to self vs. K50 to spouse. However, data from the technical 
pilot suggested the existence a preference discontinuity between K50 and K45. Starting the AT decision series 
with K45 to self vs. K45 to spouse, obviated any problems that this discontinuity might have caused at the 
analysis stage. 
6 PSs who received K40 would have been able to infer that their DMs chose K40 to spouse over K45 to self in the 
11th AT decision. 
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To elicit the individually held behavioural prescriptions, under carefully controlled conditions (most 
importantly, no talking between participants) we asked each PS and DM spouse to evaluate the 
appropriateness of: 
• a DM wife choosing K45 for herself and zero for her husband in the AT; 
• a DM wife choosing K45 for her husband and zero for herself in the AT;  
• a DM husband choosing K45 for himself and zero for his wife in the AT; and 
• a DM husband choosing K45 for his wife and zero for himself in the AT.  
They indicated the level of appropriateness of each of these actions on the following four point scale: 
• very appropriate (quantified as =1 in the analysis below) 
• somewhat appropriate (quantified as =0.33 in the analysis below) 
• somewhat inappropriate (quantified as =-0.33 in the analysis below) 
• very inappropriate (quantified as =-1 in the analysis below). 
The DM spouses undertook this evaluation task after they had completed the AT. The PS were talked 
through the first decision in the AT before making their evaluations.  
We, then, asked the DM spouses to go through the same evaluation process when the AT decision 
was between K35 for self and K45 for spouse.7 
 
To investigate whether the individually held behavioural prescriptions corresponded to or where 
distinct from any relevant social norms we asked the DM and PS spouses (again, under carefully 
controlled conditions) to repeat the evaluations. However, this time, prior to making their evaluations, 
they were told that, once they had made their evaluations (16 in the case of the DM spouses, 8 in the 
case of the PS spouses), one would be randomly selected and, if their own evaluation matched the 
most common evaluation given in this selected case within their session (more on this below) they 
would receive a payoff of K30. 
Here, who is being incentivised to match evaluations with whom, i.e., who is in a session with whom, 
is critical. We ran four evaluation sessions in each of the communities included in our study, one 
attended by PS wives, one by PS husbands, one by DM wives and one by DM husbands, with the 
sessions involving DM spouses run after they had completed the AT. So, each participant was 
incentivised to match evaluations with a sample of others of the same gender, from the same 
community and with the same prior experience of the AT. 
If a relevant social norm exists and is referenced during this task, when the incentive to match is in 
place, for a given DM type facing a given dichotomous choice, we would expect one option to be 
considered very or somewhat appropriate and the other to be considered very or somewhat 
inappropriate by the large majority or all of the participants in a session. In addition, we would expect 
the corresponding unincentivized individual evaluations to be more or similarly diverse. If instead, the 
unincentivised individual evaluations are less diverse that the incentivised ones, it indicates that the 
participants have no readily available social norm to help them match their evaluations and earn the 
K30 payoff. 
 
7 In the original design, PSs were also going to undertake this second set of evaluations and both DMs and PSs 
were going to undertake one further set of evaluations. However, our technical pilot indicated that this would 
not be possible given the daily time constraint we faced. This time constraint was binding, as we needed to 
complete all the data-generating activities in any given village within a single day in order to ensure internal 
validity. 
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If a social norm is found to exist, then the incentivised evaluations can be used to address research 
questions 5 and 6 about whether the social norm is gender-differentiated and question 7 about 
whether the social norm varies between matrilineal and patrilineal ethnic groups. If the data indicates 
that no social norm exists, then the unincentivised individual evaluations can be used to investigate 
whether and how individually held behavioural prescriptions differ between men and women and 
between members of matrilineal and patrilineal ethnic groups. In either case, the evaluations can also 
be used to investigate whether and how prior experience of the AT impacts on the apparent content 
and strength of the prescriptions or norms.  
The decisions made by the DM spouses during the AT combined with the ET1 evaluations allowed us 
to investigate whether and how decisions made by spouses about money hiding and money holding 
are informed by social norms (see research question 4) and/or individually held behavioural 
prescriptions.  
The Evaluation Task Part 2 (ET2): Using the same methods as described above, we also identified the 
content, variability and strength of individually held behavioural prescriptions and social norms that 
pertain to a list of choices about money that husbands and wives might engage in during their 
everyday lives. These were presented to the participants in the form of a vignette and corresponding 
choice set. Participants were asked to evaluate the appropriateness of each of the choices presented 
using the four point scale described above. The vignette and choice set was as follows:  
A wife (husband) finds that she (he) often has a bit of cash left over after all of the essentials have 
been bought. One day she (he) is thinking about what to do with this money and starts considering 
the following options: 
• Give it to her husband (his wife) 
• Spend it on treats for the family 
• Put it in her (his) usual hiding place in the home and tell her husband (his wife) about the 
money, but not where it is hidden 
• Put it in her (his) usual hiding place in the home without telling her husband (his wife) 
• Put it in a mobile money e-wallet and tell her husband (his wife) 
• Put it in a mobile money e-wallet without telling her husband (his wife) 
• Join a savings group and tell her husband (his wife) 
• Join a savings group without telling her husband (his wife). 
 
Only the PS completed this task and,8 owing to time constraints, in each session, the participants 
focused either on a husband or a wife considering these options. Given the latter, we are dependent 
on cross-subject comparisons when investigating gender-differentiated behavioural prescriptions and 
norms. 
 
The Evaluation Task Part 3 (ET3): Finally, we used an adaptation of the same method to evaluate 
individually held opinions and social norms relating to intimate partner violence. Here, we built on the 
widely used Demographics and Health Survey (DHS) instrument. To be consistent with the DHS, we 
asked about the justifiability (rather than the appropriateness) of wife beating within each of a set of 
scenarios. However, we rendered the task relevant to financial decision-making by adding to the list 
 
8 In our original design, the DMs also engaged in this task. However, our technical pilot indicated that this would 
not be possible given the daily time constraint. 
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of scenarios.9 In addition, as in ET1 and ET2, we invited the participants to go through the task, first 
with, then, without the matching-to-others-responses incentives. Here is the list of scenarios we used:  
• Do you think a man is justified in beating his wife if she neglects their children? 
• Do you think a man is justified in beating his wife if she burns the food? 
• Do you think a man is justified in beating his wife if she argues with him? 
• Do you think a man is justified in beating his wife if she visits family or friends without his 
permission? 
• Do you think a man is justified in beating his wife if he discovers that she is saving in a mobile 
money e-wallet? 
• Do you think a man is justified in beating his wife if he discovers that she has joined a savings 
group? 
The data generated using ET2 and ET3 allowed us to extend the investigation into the content and 
strength of individually held behavioural prescriptions and social norms impacting on choices made in 
everyday life relating to the use of financial services (see research questions 5, 6, 7).  
Survey: All of the participants in the AT and evaluation tasks also responded to a short survey designed 
to elicit individual and household characteristics, data on individual financial service use and other 
relevant background measures. Thus far, we have made only limited use of the survey data. Our 
research design enabled us to use alternative and often more effective methods, specifically, 
randomisation and fixed effects estimation, to control for differences in individual and household 
characteristics when seeking the answers to our research questions. However, in further analysis, the 
use of the survey data may yield additional insights.  
III.ii Sample design 
We undertook the quantitative data generation in Eastern Province, which is representative of Zambia 
as a whole (excluding Lusaka and the Copperbelt) with respect to living standards and use of financial 
services. Within Eastern Province, we engaged 11 Chewa (matrilineal) communities and 11 Ngoni 
(patrilineal) communities that were comparable with respect to livelihoods and living standards.  
Within each of these 22 communities, in accordance with our post-technical pilot research plan, we 
conducted: 
- 1 workshop session involving 4 husbands and 4 wives who undertook the AT under the zero 
deniability treatment;10 
- 1 workshop session involving 4 husbands and 4 wives who undertook the AT under the high 
deniability treatment; 
- 1 workshop session involving 8 wives (not also involved as DMs in the AT sessions) who 
undertook the first part of ET1 followed by ET2, and ET3; 
- 1 workshop session involving 8 husbands (not also involved as DMs in the AT sessions) who 
undertook the first part of ET1 followed by ET2, and ET3;  
- 1 workshop session involving 8 wives (previously involved as DMs in the AT sessions) who 
undertook all of ET1; 
- 1 workshop session involving 8 husbands (previously involved in as DMs the AT sessions) who 
undertook all of ET1. 
 
9 We included the DHS scenarios in our list to use as a benchmark against which to compare those of greater 
relevance to our research aims. 
10 Originally, we planned to work with 10 rather than 8 participants in each session. However, the technical 
pilot indicated that this would not be possible given the daily time constraint. 
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We ran these six session plus the survey in each community within a single day. This went a long way 
towards ensuring zero communication between participants about the tasks prior to them making 
their decisions and evaluations. However, it did not preclude the members of one community that 
had completed the tasks informing the members of another community who had yet to complete the 
task about the tasks so that the latter could discuss the tasks before engaging. In the few village 
clusters in which we thought this could be an issue, we conducted unstructured interviews with small 
samples of participants to find out what, if anything, they had heard about the tasks prior to their 
workshops. Thus, we learnt that some had heard that we could be trusted, i.e., that, to the extent that 
the participants could tell, we were paying people at the end of the workshops in accordance with 
what we were telling people during the workshops. However, none of those interviewed felt that they 
had gained sufficient prior understanding of the tasks to have been able to collude with their fellow 
community members.   
Had it been implemented to the letter; this sample design would have yielded: 
• 1936 AT decisions made by 88 husbands and 88 wives under the zero deniability treatment; 
• 1936 AT decisions made by 88 husbands and 88 wives under the high deniability treatment; 
• 1408 ET1 series 1 evaluations made by 176 husbands, 88 of whom had previously engaged in 
the AT, and 176 wives, 88 of whom had previously engaged in the AT; 
• 704 ET1 series 2 evaluations made by 88 husbands and 88 wives, all of whom had previously 
engaged in the AT;  
• 2,816 ET2 evaluations made by 88 husbands and 88 wives, none of whom had previously 
engaged in the AT; and  
• 2,464 ET3 evaluations made by 88 husbands and 88 wives, none of whom had previously 
engaged in the AT. 
However, one wife had to leave a workshop in order to take her baby to a clinic after completing the 
AT but before engaging in ET1 or the survey and one man registered for a workshop with a woman 
who, during the survey, we discovered was not the man’s wife. The AT decisions of the wife who left 
and all the evaluations made by her husband are included in the analyses presented below. All of the 
data pertaining to the unmarried man and woman who registered as a couple were deleted from the 
dataset. These two attendance issues account for all the apparent inconsistencies between the by-
design sample sizes listed above and the actual sample sizes reported below.   
We conducted all 22 data-generating workshops during the second half of August 2019. 
 
III.iii Analytical methods 
Most of the findings presented below have been derived using statistical regression analysis. However, 
with the aim of making our findings accessible to a diverse audience, wherever possible, in the main 
text of this report, we present the analysis in graphical form. The regression model specifications and 
the estimations upon which the graphs are based and some of the additional estimations run to check 
the robustness of results are presented in the Analytical Appendix.  
IV Analysis and results 
This section is organised by research question. For each question we present the relevant data in 
graphical form and then the results of the relevant regression analyses. As we proceed, the 
conclusions we draw are clearly labelled and presented in bold text).   
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1. Are spouses in Zambia willing to compromise household economic efficiency in order to 
maintain individual control over money?  
 
We can answer this question using the data from the AT. Figure 1 (below) plots the proportion of 
spouses allocating to self (vertical axis) for each of the 11 AT decisions (horizontal axis) under the high 
deniability treatment (green dots) and zero deniability treatment (orange dots). The figure reveals 
considerable willingness on the part of spouses to compromise household-level economic efficiency 
in order to maintain individual control over money.11  
 
In total, 42% of the Allocation Task decisions were to self, despite the fact that allocating to self was 
the inefficient option in 82% of the decisions. Across the 9 decisions in which allocating to self was 
inefficient, on average the spouses were willing to incur a cost of K7.94 (17.6%) to be the one holding 
the money at the end of the workshop. Put another way, on average when making these decisions, 
the spouses preferred to have K37.06 in their own hand rather than K45 in the hand of their spouse. 
 
Around 30% (107) of the AT decision-making spouses chose to allocate to spouse in the 40:45 decision, 
i.e., the one decision in which allocating to self was the efficient option. Of these 43% were wives. 
 
Conclusion: Spouses in Zambia are willing to compromise household economic efficiency in order to 
maintain individual control over money. 
 
Figure 1: Allocations to self in the Allocation Task 
 
Source: authors’ data. 
 
 
11 It is worth noting that over 50% of the DMs flick-flacked between self and spouse across these decisions. This 
flick-flacking is inconsistent with any simple economic model of decision-making. In about half of these cases it 
looks like the DM switched from self to spouse early, experienced regret as they saw the to-self payoff decline 
from one decision to the next, and so switched back for a while to secure a higher chance of some payoff for 
themselves. However, we do not know, for sure that this was their reasoning and, in the other half of cases, 
there is no easy way to rationalise the data. It is this flick-flacking that is behind the relatively flat sections of the 
plots between decision 35:45 and 10:45. Throughout our regression analysis, we treat these inconsistencies as 
“noise”, i.e., as contributors to regression model errors.  
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2. Specifically, when given the opportunity to do so, do spouses hide money from each other even 
when hiding is costly? 
 
Figure 1 shows that, for 7 out of the 11 AT decisions, a greater proportion of spouses allocated to self 
under the high deniability treatment (green) than under the zero deniability treatment (orange) and, 
for the remaining 4 decisions, the proportions were similar. This suggests that, when they can hide 
their compromising of household efficiency in order to maintain individual control over money, 
spouses compromise it more. However, when we analyse the husbands’ and wives’ decisions 
together, the cross-treatment difference is not statistically significant (see Table A1, Model 1, in the 
Analytical Appendix).  
 
Before drawing a conclusion here, we should consider the analysis relating to question 3. 
 
 
3. Are wives and husbands differentially inclined to incur costs with the aim of hiding and, 
thereby, maintaining individual control over money?  
 
In Figure 2 (below) we separate the husbands’ and wives’ AT decisions.  The panel on the right 
indicates that, when wives can hide their compromising of household efficiency in order to maintain 
individual control over money, they compromise it more. In contrast, the panel on the left indicates 
that husbands’ choices are indistinguishable across the treatments. Regression analysis lends support 
to these indications (see Table A1, Model 2, in the Analytical Appendix). The treatment effect is 
statistically significant for wives (p=0.022) but not for husbands and, under the high deniability 
treatment, wives compromise household efficiency more than husbands (p=0.003), while under the 
low deniability treatment, there is no difference between husbands’ and wives’ behaviour. 
  
Figure 2: Allocations to self by wives and husbands in the Allocation Task  
 
 
Source: authors’ data 
 
Conclusion: Wives are more likely to compromise household-level efficiency in order to maintain 
individual control over money when they can keep that money and their actions hidden from their 
husbands. This is not the case for husbands. 
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4. Are the decisions made by spouses about money hiding, money holding, and money and 
financial service use informed by social norms about who within households should hold and 
make decisions about money?  
 
We start this section by looking at the ET1 data which relates to individually held behavioural 
prescriptions and social norms about money holding that may have affected decision-making in the 
AT. The ET1 data are presented in Figure 3. The evaluations made by wives are presented on the 
lefthand side of the figure. The evaluations made by husbands are presented on the right. The 
evaluations relating to the 45:45 AT decision are presented in the top half of the figure. The 
evaluations relating to the 35:45 AT decision are presented in the bottom half. Within the top half of 
the figure, the upper two panels present the evaluations made in the absence of the incentive to 
match and the lower two panels present the evaluations made when the incentive to match was in 
place. Within each panel, the first column presents the evaluations of a wife allocating to herself, the 
second column presents the evaluations of a wife allocating to her husband, the third column presents 
the evaluations of a husband allocating to himself, and the fourth column presents the evaluations of 
a husband allocating to his wife. Within each column, the green part indicates the proportion 
evaluating the action as very appropriate, the yellow part indicates the proportion evaluating the 
action as somewhat appropriate, the orange part indicates the proportion evaluating the action as 
somewhat inappropriate, and the red part indicates the proportion evaluating the action as very 
inappropriate. 
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Figure 3: Evaluations of appropriateness of options in the Allocation Task (ET1) 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ data 
 18 
 
In order to inform behaviour, a social norm first needs to exist. Currently, in the behavioural 
experimental literature, there is no agreed method for formally testing a null hypothesis of the form 
“there is no social norm pertaining to decisions in context …”. However, there are several 
characteristics of the ET1 data that are inconsistent with the existence of a social norm informing 
decisions in the AT. Two of these characteritics are apparent from Figure 3. First, for each evaluator-
type-DM-type-action case, there was quite a lot of variation in evaluations, even when the incentive 
to match was in place. Second, where we see less variation in individual evaluations – most notably, 
over 70% of wives indicated that they individually thought it was very appropriate for a wife to allocate 
to herself in the 45:45 decision – there was greater variation when the incentive to match was in place 
than when it was absent. This is inconsistent with husbands or wives having shared views about what 
husbands and wives should do that they can reference when trying to match, i.e., it is inconsistent 
with the existence of social norms. 
 
However, these characteristics of the dataset could be misleading. It could be that the variation within 
each column in Figure 3 is owing not to the absence of social norms but to differences in social norms 
across communities and, hence, across the sessions within which the evaluations were made and the 
incentive to match was relevant. To investigate this possiblity, we conducted an evaluation-by-
session-level analysis. Across 88 sessions, a total of 528 evaluations of possible actions in the AT were 
made, while the incentive to match was in place. Among these 528 evaluations:12 
• perfect matching, i.e., all participants making the same evaluation when the incentive to match 
was in place, was achieved in only 6 (1.1%); 
• partial matching, i.e., all stating that the action was either very or somewhat appropriate or all 
stating that the action was either very or somewhat inappropriate, was achieved in only a further 
54 (10.2%); 
• there was a single modal evaluation in 440 (83.3%); but 
• within these 440, on average, fewer than 5 out of the 8 participants’ evaluations matched the 
mode. 
Further, statistical regression analysis reveals that there was significantly more within session 
variation in the evaluations when the incentive to match was in place than when it was not (see Table 
A2 in the Analytical Appendix). So, even when we allow for the possibility that social norms relevant 
to the AT vary across communities, we find statistically signficant patterns in our data that are 
inconsistent with the existence of any such social norm.  
 
Conclusion: The decisions made by spouses in the AT were not informed by social norms about who 
within households should hold money. 
 
However, this does not rule out the possibility that individually held behavioural prescriptions and 
inter-spousal differences in such prescriptions informed the AT decisions. To investigate this, we 
define three new variables. The first variable, which we shall call the relative evaluation, is the relative 
appropriateness of allocating to self as the evaluation made by a specific evaluator of a specific DM-
type facing a specific decision choosing to allocate to self minus the evaluation made by the same 
evaluator of the same DM-type facing the same decision choosing to allocate to spouse. Given the 
way in which the action-specific evaluations are quantified, the maximum value that a relative 
evaluation can take is 2, indicating that allocating to self is very appropriate and allocating to spouse 
 
12 In debriefs with the field researchers, we heard that many spouses indicated that K30 was sufficient 
incentive to try and match others’ evaluations, but struggled to imagine what those others’ evaluations would 
be. 
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is very inappropriate, the minimum value it can take is -2, indicating that allocating to self is very 
inappropriate and allocating to spouse is very appropriate, and a relative evaluation of zero can be 
interpreted as indifference between the two possible actions. The second variable, which we shall call 
the self-relevant prescription, is the relative evaluation made by evaluator 𝑖 of a DM of the same type 
as 𝑖 facing AT decision 45:45. In the analysis below, this variable captures what a DM thinks he or she 
should do in the AT. The more positive (negative) this variable the surer the DM is that he or she should 
allocate to self (spouse). On average, the DMs’ self-relevant prescription was 0.261 indicating that, on 
average, they thought they should allocate to self. However, it varied markedly across DMs (see Figure 
A1, Analytical Appendix). The third variable, which we shall call the inter-spousal prescription 
difference, is the relative evaluation made by evaluator 𝑖’s spouse of a DM of the same type as 𝑖 facing 
AT decision 45:45 minus 𝑖’s self-relevant prescription. In the analysis below, this variable captures the 
difference between what a DM’s spouse thinks the DM should do in the AT and what the DM him- or 
herself thinks he or she should do.13 If this variable is negative (positive) it indicates that a DM’s spouse 
is less (more) inclined to think that the DM should allocate to self than the DM him- or herself. On 
average, the DMs’ inter-spousal prescription difference was -0.354 indicating that, on average, the 
PSs were less inclined than their DM spouses to think that the DMs should allocate to self. However, 
this variable also varied markedly across DMs (see Figure A1, Analytical Appendix).  
 
We would expect that a DM’s own individually held behavioural prescriptions would inform his or her 
own behaviour. So, our ex ante expectation was that the higher a DM’s self-relevant prescription the 
more likely they would be to allocate to self in the AT.  
 
The foundations for our ex ante expectations relating to the inter-spousal prescription difference 
were a little more complicated. First, for this second variable to affect what a DM does in the AT, the 
DM needs to have some sense of what his or her spouse thinks. The DMs and their PS spouses had no 
opportunity to discuss the AT before each made their ET1 evaluations so, for this to be the case, the 
DM’s spouse would need to successfully extrapolate from what they know about their spouses in 
everyday life. Let us assume that this is the case. Second, we would expect the inter-spousal 
prescription difference to impact on a DM’s decision-making only when the DM knows that their 
spouse will, at some point, find out what they chose to do in the AT, i.e., if the DM undertook the AT 
under the zero deniability treatment. Under the high deniability treatment, the DM is free to do as he 
or she thinks appropriate, which might incorporate some aspect of what they think their spouse 
thinks. They do not need to consider further behavioural adjustments to accommodate aspects of 
what they think their spouse thinks that they have not incorporated into their own thinking because 
their spouse is not going to find out what they did. So, our ex ante expectations were that the higher 
the inter-spousal prescription difference the more likely a DM would be to allocate to self under the 
low deniability treatment in the AT, but that the inter-spousal prescription difference would have no 
effect on decisions made under the high deniability treatment.      
 
Introducing these two new variables into the regression analysis of AT decisions (see Table A3 in the 
Analytical Appendix) yields the following results: 
• as expected, the higher a DM’s self-relevant prescription the more likely they were to allocate 
to self in the AT irrespective of the treatment to which they were assigned (p=0.030 and 0.003 
for the low and high deniability treatments respectively); 
 
13 We focus on the 45:45 AT decision options because, unlike the 35:45 decision options, these were evaluated 
by both the DMs and their PS spouses. 
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• as expected, the higher the inter-spousal prescription difference the more likely a DM was to 
allocate to self under the low deniability treatment in the AT; and 
• as expected, the inter-spousal prescription difference had no effect on decisions made under 
the high deniability treatment.      
 
Before concluding, it is important to mention that, while these findings are consistent with individually 
held behavioural prescriptions informing AT decision-making, the analysis above does not provide 
unequivocal support for this as a conclusion. This is because the DMs’ own individually held 
behavioural prescriptions were elicited after they had made the AT decisions and we know that 
making such decisions affected the ET1 evaluations that were subsequently made (see Table A11 and 
Figure A2 in the Analytical Appendix) and this leads to what is commonly referred to as an endogeneity 
problem. 
 
Conclusions: Individually held behavioural prescriptions informed decision-making in the AT. 
Specifically, the more appropriate individuals thought it was for them to allocate money to 
themselves rather than their spouses, the more likely they were to do precisely that. Further, when 
the individuals knew their spouses would find out what they had done in the AT, they took their 
spouses’ opinions about what they should do into account when making their decisions, i.e., they 
compromised.  
 
The findings about the relationship between own and spouses’ individually held behavioural 
prescriptions and own decisions are important not only because they support the conclusions above, 
but also because they speak to the validity of our experimental designs. Had we been unable to 
identify a positive relationship between what DMs thought they should do in the AT and what they 
actually did in the AT, it would have cast doubt on the DMs’ understanding of the AT and ET1 and the 
link between the two and, hence, on all of the findings generated using the AT and ET1 data that are 
presented above. Finding no relationship between the inter-spousal prescription difference and DMs’ 
decisions in the AT would have been less damning. However, the fact that we do find such a 
relationship and that the relationship that we find is consistent with our ex ante expectations indicates 
that the spouses who participated in our research not only had a reasonable understanding of the AT 
and ET1 and the link between the two, but were also able to draw on experiences from their everyday 
lives when trying to imagine what their spouses were thinking about the tasks. This is tremendously 
important as it signals that our findings have external vilidity, i.e., can be considered relevant when 
thinking about husbands’ and wives’ behaviour in everyday life. The logic behind this is that, if the 
spouses consider everyday life to be of relevance when deciding what to do in the experiment, then 
we should consider what the spouses do in the experiment as informative about what they do and 
why they do what they do in everyday life.  
 
We now turn to the ET2 data. In ET2, we applied the same methods as in ET1 but to the elicitation of 
behavioural prescriptions relating to everyday life decision-making scenarios. Because the methods 
are the same and the decision-making scenarios have more in common with everyday life, it is 
reasonable to assume that ET2 will have at least as much if not more external validity.  
 
The ET2 data are presented in Figure 4. The evaluations by wives are presented in the top half of the 
figure. The evaluations by husbands are presented in the bottom half. The evaluations of a wife taking 
each of the options she has regarding what to do with a bit of spare cash are presented on the left of 
the figure. The evaluations of a husband taking each of the options are presented on the right. Within 
the top half of the figure, the upper two panels present the evaluations made in the absence of the 
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incentive to match and the lower two panels present the evaluations made when the incentive to 
match was in place. This same applies to the bottom half of the figure. Within each panel, each column 
presents the evaluations of a wife or husband choosing a specific option and the columns are ordered 
from left to right as follows: 
1. give the cash to her or his spouse 
2. spend the cash on treats for the family 
3. hide the cash at home and tell spouse about the cash but not where it is hidden 
4. hide the cash at home and don’t tell spouse about the cash 
5. put the money in an e-wallet and tell spouse 
6. put the money in an e-wallet and don’t tell spouse 
7. join a savings group and tell spouse 
8. join a savings group and don’t tell spouse. 
 
Within each column, the green part indicates the proportion evaluating the action as very appropriate, 
the yellow part indicates the proportion evaluating the action as somewhat appropriate, the orange 
part indicates the proportion evaluating the action as somewhat inappropriate, and the red part 
indicates the proportion evaluating the action as very inappropriate. 
 
Here, unlike in the corresponding figure for ET1, for some actions we see very strong modal 
evaluations. Most notably, across all the panels, saving, by hiding cash at home, putting it in an e-
wallet or joining a savings group, and keeping it secret from one’s spouse is thought most often to be 
very inappropriate. In constrast, saving and telling one’s spouse is thought most often to be very 
appropriate. Regression analyses indicate that these apparent patterns in the data are statistically 
significant. Saving and keeping it secret from one’s spouse is signficantly less appropriate than any of 
the other options on average and for each evaluator-type-decision-maker-type combination (p<0.001 
in all case, see Table A4, Analytical Appendix). Saving and telling one’s spouse is signficantly more 
appropriate than any of the other options on average and for each evaluator-type-decision-maker-
type combination (p<0.003 in all case, see Table A5, Analytical Appendix). Among the savings options, 
joining a savings group and telling one’s spouse is considered most appropriate irrespective of who is 
evaluating whom (p<0.001 on average, but not for all evaluator-type-decision-maker-type 
combinations, see Table A6, Analytical Appendix). Saving in an e-wallet and telling one’s spouse and 
hiding the cash at home and telling one’s spouse take second and third place respectively (see Table 
A6, Analytical Appendix).  
 
These findings are indicative of the existence of a social norm forbidding saving in secret from one’s 
spouse. Taken at face value, the data could also be signalling the existence of a social norm prescribing 
saving and telling one’s spouse. However, given how difficult saving is for people like those 
participating this study, it is probably better to describe this as a collective or commonly held 
aspiration rather than as a social norm.   
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Figure 4: Evaluations of appropriateness of options regarding what to do with “spare cash” (ET2) 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ data 
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To further our investigation into whether a social norm forbidding saving in secret from ones spouse 
exists, we conducted an evaluation-by-session-level analysis similar to the presented above for ET1. 
Across 88 sessions, a total of 352 ET2 evaluations were made, while the incentive to match was in 
place. Among these 352 evaluations: 
• perfect matching, i.e., all participants making the same evaluation when the incentive to match 
was in place, was achieved in 50 (14.2%) 
• partial matching, i.e., all stating that the action was either very or somewhat appropriate or all 
stating that the action was either very or somewhat inappropriate, was achieved in a further 72 
(20.5%) 
• there was a single modal evaluation in 336 (95.5%); and 
• within these 336, on average, more than 6 out of the 8 participants’ evaluations matched the 
mode.  
Further, statistical regression analyses revealed that there was no more within session variation in the 
evaluations when the incentive to match was in place than when it was not (see Table A7 in the 
Analytical Appendix) and that the evaluations made in the absence and in the presence of the 
incentive to match are very highly correlated (p<0.0001) with 63% of the variation in each being 
explained by the other.  
 
The analysis above indicates that the spouses were more successful with regard to matching their 
evaluations in ET2 as compared to ET1. In particular, that there was a single mode in over 95% of the 
evaluations and that, within these, on average, more than 6 out of the 8 participants’ evaluations 
matched that mode is consistent with the existence of a collectively held and collectively recognised 
behavioural prescription, i.e., with the existence of a social norm. That the evaluations made in the 
absence and in the presence of the incentive to match are highly correlated is consistent with the 
social norm having been internalised by many of the participants in our research study. However, this 
strong correlation combined with the finding the there was no less within session variation in the 
evaluations when the incentive to match was in place means that we cannot unequivocally conclude 
that a social norm exists.      
 
There is one more element in our dataset that is relevant to the issue of whether a social norm 
forbidding saving and keeping it secret from one’s spouse exists. Social norms are often enforced 
through the punishment of norm violators and ET3 was specifically designed to investigate whether a 
wife secretly belonging to a savings group or secretly saving in an e-wallet were considered justifiable 
grounds for wife-beating.    
 
Figure 5 presents the ET3 data. The upper panel presents the evaluations made in the absence of the 
incentive to match. The lower panel presents the evaluations made in the presence of the incentive 
to match. In each panel, there is a pair of bars relating to each of the questions asked during the 
task. The order of the questions, left to right, is as follows:  
1. Do you think a man is justified in beating his wife if she neglects their children? 
2. Do you think a man is justified in beating his wife if she burns the food? 
3. Do you think a man is justified in beating his wife if she argues with him? 
4. Do you think a man is justified in beating his wife if she visits family or friends without his 
permission? 
5. Do you think a man is justified in beating his wife if he discovers that she is saving in a mobile 
money e-wallet? 
6. Do you think a man is justified in beating his wife if he discovers that she has joined a savings 
group? 
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Figure 5: Evaluations of justifiability of wife beating (ET3) 
 
Source: authors’ data 
 
Within a pair of bars, the height of the left-hand dark pink bar indicates the proportion of wives 
responding that the man is justified in beating his wife and the height of the left-hand dark pink bar 
indicates the proportion of husbands responding that the man is justified in beating his wife. 
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The most notable feature in the ET3 data is that wives are more inclined than husbands to think wife-
beating is justifyable. A similar finding was reported in the 2018 Zambian DHS, where 46% of women 
versus 26% of men believed that it was justifiable for wives to be beaten by their husband for any one 
of the following: burning food; arguing; going out without telling him; neglecting children; making 
major household purchases without telling him; and refusing sex. However, here, the issue under 
investigation is not whether and how evaluations differ depending on the gender of the evaluator, but 
on whether and to what extent saving in secret is considered punishable.  
 
We focus on the evaluations made when the incentive to match was absent because, as in ET1, 
introducing the incentive to match increased the within session variance in evaluations, particularly 
for husbands (see Table A8, Analytical Appendix). 
 
When the incentive to match was absent, 30% of wives and 15% of husbands indicated that a man 
beating his wife if he discovered that she was saving in an e-wallet or had joined a savings group was 
justifiable. After accounting for the marked gender difference, the patterns of relative justifiability 
across the seven scenarios are similar for husbands and wives (see notes below Table A9, Analytical 
Appendix). Beating a wife who is discovered to be saving in an e-wallet or to have joined a savings 
group is as justifiable as beating a wife for neglecting children, visiting friends or family in secret and 
refusing to have sex, and more justifiable than beating wife for burning the food or arguing (see Table 
A9, Analytical Appendix). These findings are also consistent with the existence of a social norm 
forbidding saving and keeping it secret from one’s spouse. However, they too do not provide 
unequivocal evidence of its existence.     
 
Conclusions: There is strong but not unequivocal evidence pointing to the existence of a social norm 
forbidding saving in secret from ones spouse. If such a social norm exists, it has been internalised 
by many spouses in Eastern Province. If such a norm does not exist, then an individually held 
behavioural prescription forbidding saving in secret from ones spouse is held by the very large 
majority of spouses in Eastern Province. Just under one in three wives and one in six husbands think 
that a man is justified in beating his wife if he discovers that she is saving in an e-wallet or has joined 
a savings group. Thus, as a grounds for wife beating, saving in secret is on a par with neglecting the 
children, visiting friends or family in secret and refusing to have sex. There is also evidence pointing 
to the existence of a collective or commonly held aspiration to save.    
 
 
5.  Specifically, if a wife chooses to hold and make independent decisions about money and financial 
service use, is she violating a norm? 
 
To address this question, we draw on the analysis and findings presented above in relation to research 
question 4.  
 
Conclusions: A wife choosing to hold money in the AT, i.e., choosing to allocate money to herself 
rather than her husband in the AT, is not violating a social norm. However, it may be inconsistent 
with an individual behavioural prescription that either she or her husband or both hold. There is 
strong but not unequivocal evidence that a wife choosing to save in secret from her husband is 
violating a social norm and some think that her husband would be justified in beating her under 
such circumstances. However, here it is important to note that it is the secrecy and not the saving 
that is the violation. 
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6.  Do the social norms that women acknowledge as guides to the way they should behave differ 
from the social norms that men think should be guiding women’s behaviour (and vice-versa)?  
 
To address this question, we draw and build on the analysis and findings presented above in relation 
to research question 4.  
 
The analysis of the ET2 data presented above, indicates the existence of a social norm forbidding 
saving in secret from ones spouse exists. Figure 4 and the corresponding regression analyses go on to 
indicate that both husbands and wives think that this behavioural prescription applies to both 
husbands and wives; saving and keeping it secret from one’s spouse was found to be considerably and 
signficantly less appropriate than any of the other ET2 options both on average and for each evaluator-
type-decision-maker-type combination (p<0.001 in all case, see Table A4, Analytical Appendix).  
 
However, Figure 4 and the regressions also indicate that the extent to which violations of this norm 
are tolerated varies depending on whether the violator is a husband or wife and on who is doing the 
evaluation. Wives are signficantly less tolerant than husbands of secret saving by husbands (p<0.001, 
see Table A4, Analytical Appendix) and significantly more tolerant than husbands of secret saving by 
wives (p<0.001, see Table A4, Analytical Appendix). Correspondingly, wives think that husbands saving 
and telling their wives is signficantly more appropriate than do the husbands themselves (p<0.001, 
see Table A5, Analytical Appendix).  
 
Conclusion: Assuming it exists, the social norm forbidding saving in secret from ones spouse applies 
to both husbands and wives and this is acknowledge by both husbands and wives. However, the 
extent to which norm violation is tolerated depends on who is doing the violating and who the 
evaulating; wives are less tolerant than husbands of secret saving by husbands and more tolerant 
than husbands of secret saving by wives.   
 
There is one other aspect of Figure 4 that is worth investigating in relation to this question. Irrespective 
of whether one focuses on the evaluations made in the presence or absence of the incentive to match, 
the figure indicates that the very large majority (<85%) of both husbands and wives thought it very 
appropriate for husbands to give their spare cash to their spouses, i.e., their wives. The majority of 
husbands also thought it vary appropriate for wives to give their spare cash to their spouses. However, 
the husbands were, on average, more tolerant of a wife deviating from this behavioural prescription 
than a husband deviating (p=0.008, see Table A10, Analytical Appendix). In contrast, the wives had 
much more varied opinions about the appropriateness of a wife giving her spare cash to her husband 
and, on average, were even more tolerant than the husbands of a wife deviating from this behavioural 
prescription (p=0.067, see Table A10, Analytical Appendix).     
 
Conclusion: A social norm prescribing that husbands should give their spare cash to their wives may 
exist and be acknowledged by both husbands and wives. However, wives do not acknowledge the 
existence of a social norm prescribing that wives should give their spare cash to their husbands and, 
if husbands acknowledge such a norm, they are far more tolerant of wives deviating from the norm 
than they are of husbands deviating.   
 
Recall that the analysis of the AT and ET1 data indicated that, while the DMs’ decisions in the AT were 
not informed by social norms, they were informed by the DMs’ own and their spouses’ individually 
held behavioural prescriptions. This being the case, it is interesting investigate whether the 
 27 
 
individually held behavioural presecriptions that guided the wives’ behaviour in the AT differ from 
those that guided the husbands’ behaviour. 
  
Figure 6 (below) presents the average relative evaluations by each evaluator-type for each DM-type-
decision-type combination. Recall that the maximum value that a relative evaluation can take is 2, 
indicating that allocating to self is very appropriate and allocating to spouse is very inappropriate, the 
minimum value it can take is -2, indicating that allocating to self is very inappropriate and allocating 
to spouse is very appropriate, and a relative evaluation of zero can be interpreted as indifference 
between the two possible actions.  The heights of the bars indicate the size of the average relative 
evaluations. The p-value reported above or below each bar relates to the null hypothesis that the 
mean relative evaluation is zero, i.e., that the evaluator considers allocating to self neither more nor 
less appropriate than allocating to spouse. The whiskers on each bar define the 95% confidence 
interval of the corresponding average relative evaluation. The p-values and confidence intervals are 
derived from a regression (see Table A11, Model 1, in the Analytical Appendix).  
 
Figure 6: Relative evaluations of actions in the AT by types of evaluator and decision-maker 
                                                                                     
 
Source: authors’ data 
 
The most important and notable findings from this analysis are that: 
• On average, husbands are indifferent to the allocating actions of DM husbands and close to 
indifferent to the actions of DM wives facing the 45:45 decision (p=0.387 and 0.071 
respectively); 
• On average, wives are close to indifferent to the allocating actions of DM husbands facing the 
45:45 decision (p=0.090), but consider wives allocating to themselves as relatively appropriate 
(p<0.001);  
• Wives think it signficantly more appropriate for wives to allocate to themselves in the 45:45 
decision than do husbands (p<0.001); 
• Wives think it signficantly more appropriate for wives to allocate to themselves in the 45:45 
decision than for husbands to allocate to themselves (p<0.001); 
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• Wives think it somewhat less appropriate for husbands to allocate to themselves in the 45:45 
decision than do husbands (p=0.066); 
• In general, both wives and husbands think it less appropriate to allocate to self when doing so 
is costly to the household, i.e., when facing the 35:45 decision (p=0.023 or lower). 
• However, on average, wives are indifferent to the allocating actions of DM wives facing the 
35:45 decision (p=0.132).  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that when we separate out the evaluations of the DM and PS spouses, we 
find that the PS wives’ evaluations of husbands’ actions are more extreme than the DM wives’ 
evaluation. Specifically, compared to the DM wives, the PS wives think it even more appropriate that 
wives allocate to themselves when there is no cost of doing so and think it significantly inappropriate 
for husbands to do likewise (see Table A11, Model 2, and Figure A2 in the Analytical Appendix). 
 
Conclusions: Individually held behavioural prescriptions pertaining to the AT vary depending on who 
is doing the prescribing, to whom the prescription applies and on the specifics of the decision being 
faced. Wives have much stronger opinions than husbands about what wives and husbands should 
do. There is strong evidence that wives think that wives should allocate to themselves when doing 
so imposes no cost on the household and weak evidence that they think that husbands should 
allocate to their wives. In general, both wives and husbands think it is inappropriate for spouses to 
allocate to themselves when doing so imposes a cost on the household. However, wives think that 
this cost is offset when it is a wife who is allocating to herself.  
 
 
5. Do social norms about who within a household is supposed to hold and make decisions about 
money vary systematically depending on whether a community is matrilineal or patrilineal? 
The analysis of the ET2 data revealed a social norm forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouse (see 
text above and Table A4, Analytical Appendix). When we build on the analysis of the ET2 data by 
distinguishing between spouses living in matrilineal and patrilineal communities, we find no evidence 
of differences in social norm content, but several differences in the strength of the behavioural 
prescriptions as they apply to wives and husbands that are consistent with prior expectations. 
Specifically, with regard to the social norm forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouse we find:  
• violations of the norm by husbands are tolerated less by both wives and husbands in 
patrilineal communities; and 
• wives in patrilineal communities have especially varied opinions about and are, on average, 
close to indifference about violations of the norm by wives (see Table A12, Analytical 
Appendix). 
With regard to the appropriateness of saving and telling one’s spouse, when we distinguish between 
spouses living in matrilineal and patrilineal communities, we find: 
• while wives in both patrilineal and matrilineal communities consider it very appropriate for 
husbands to save and tell their wives, the former consider it significantly more appropriate 
than the latter; 
• wives in patrilineal communities have especially varied opinions about and are, on average, 
close to indifference about whether wives should save and tell their spouses (see Table A13, 
Analytical Appendix). 
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Finally, with regard to the appropriateness of giving spare cash to one’s spouse, when we distinguish 
between spouses living in matrilineal and patrilineal communities, we find that: 
• while husbands in both patrilineal and matrilineal communities consider it very appropriate 
for husbands to give their spare cash to their wives, the former consider it significantly more 
appropriate than the latter (see Table A14, Analytical Appendix). 
Each of these findings is consistent with husbands in patrilineal communities being seen as having 
greater responsibility towards their wives and their children compared to husbands in matrilineal 
communities.  
Conclusion: Social norms about who within a household is supposed to hold and make decisions 
about money do not vary systematically depending on whether a community is matrilineal or 
patrilineal. However, the extent to which deviations from the norms and prescriptions by wives and 
husbands are tolerated does vary systematically depending on whether a community is matrilineal 
or patrilineal and the variations are consistent with husbands in patrilineal communities being seen 
as having greater responsibility towards their wives and their children.      
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Analytical Appendix 
 
Table A1: Regression analysis of Allocation Task decisions 
Dependent variable = 1 if allocated to self in Allocation Task 
 Model 1  Model 2 
   
Husbands Wives 
Low   
deniability 
High 
deniability 
Constant   0.590*** 0.609*** 0.590*** 0.570*** 
   (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.084) 
High deniability# 0.036  -0.020 0.091**   
 (0.025)  (0.040) (0.039)   
DM=Wife (dmw)#     0.019 0.130*** 
     (0.044) (0.042) 
AT decision:       
  40:45 -0.234***  -0.234*** 
 (0.035)  (0.035) 
  35:45 -0.217***  -0.217*** 
 (0.036)  (0.036) 
  30:45 -0.299***  -0.299*** 
 (0.032)  (0.032) 
  25:45 -0.285***  -0.285*** 
 (0.038)  (0.038) 
  20:45 -0.305***  -0.305*** 
 (0.034)  (0.034) 
  15:45 -0.342***  -0.342*** 
 (0.032)  (0.032) 
  10:45 -0.339***  -0.339*** 
 (0.036)  (0.036) 
   5:45 -0.385***  -0.385*** 
 (0.036)  (0.036) 
   0:45 -0.570***  -0.570*** 
 (0.038)  (0.038) 
  45:40 0.003  0.003 
 (0.025)  (0.025) 
Village fes yes  Yes 
Script reader fes yes  Yes 
Observations 3,861  3,861 
R-squared 0.163  0.172 
Notes: Marginal effects from two LPM estimations presented; an observation is a decision in the Allocation 
Task; each participant made 11 decisions; AT decision basis for comparison is  45:45; standard errors adjusted 
for non-independence within sessions (44) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; # p-value on 
difference in effect across genders/treatments is 0.74.  
 
Source: authors’ data   
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Table A2: Regression analysis of within-session variation in ET1 
evaluations  
Dependent variable = SD = the within session standard deviation in an evaluation of a specific 
evaluator-type-DM-type-action   
 Model 1  Model 2 
   Husbands Husbands Wives Wives 
   evaluating evaluating evaluating evaluating 
   DM husbands DM wives DM husbands DM wives 
Constant 0.653***  0.615*** 0.605*** 0.648*** 0.659*** 
 (0.014)  (0.038) (0.036) (0.040) (0.046) 
Incentive to match (IM) 0.046***  0.024 0.047*** 0.027 0.086*** 
 (0.011)  (0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.026) 
Patrilineal (PL)   -0.046 -0.027 0.007 -0.033 
   (0.038) (0.037) (0.042) (0.040) 
Allocate to self (AS)   0.044 0.048* 0.110*** -0.151*** 
   (0.035) (0.028) (0.035) (0.037) 
35:45 decision (D35:45)   -0.008 0.022 0.004 0.030 
   (0.029) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) 
AS x D35:45   0.045 0.067* -0.012 0.207*** 
   (0.045) (0.040) (0.045) (0.046) 
Experimental controls no  Yes 
Observations 1,056  1,056 
R-squared 0.011  0.113 
Notes: An observation is an evaluation by all the participants in a session; Basis for comparison = allocate to 
spouse in 45:45 decision; Experimental controls = a dummy indicating that 7 (not 8) spouses participated in 
the session, a dummy indicating that the participants had not previously engaged in the AT and the latter 
interacted with the genders of the evaluator and the decision-maker; robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: authors’ data 
 
The specification of Model 2 is as follows:  
 
𝑆𝐷𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑀𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑃𝐿𝑗 + 𝛼3𝐴𝑆𝑗 + 𝛼4𝐷35: 45𝑗 + 𝛼5(𝐴𝑆 × 𝐷35: 45)𝑗  
      +𝛽0𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽1(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐼𝑀)𝑗 + 𝛽2(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑃𝐿)𝑗 + 𝛽3(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐴𝑆)𝑗 + 𝛽4(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐷35: 45)𝑗 
        +𝛽5(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐴𝑆 × 𝐷35: 45)𝑗 + 𝛾0𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗 + 𝛾1(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝐼𝑀)𝑗 + 𝛾2(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑃𝐿)𝑗 + 𝛾3(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝐴𝑆)𝑗 
            +𝛾4(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝐷35: 45)𝑗 + 𝛾5(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝐴𝑆 × 𝐷35: 45)𝑗 + 𝛿0(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒)𝑗 
               +𝛿1(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐼𝑀)𝑗 + 𝛿2(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑃𝐿)𝑗 + 𝛿3(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐴𝑆)𝑗 
                  +𝛿4(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐷35: 45)𝑗 + 𝛿5(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐴𝑆 × 𝐷35: 45)𝑗 + 𝑪𝜽 + 𝑢𝑗 
 
where: 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑗 = 1 if evaluators were wives and zero otherwise; 𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗 = 1 if decision-maker in 
scenario being evaluated was a wife and zero otherwise; 𝑪 is a vector of experimental controls 
(see table note for details); 𝑢𝑗 is the error term; and the other variables are as defined in Table 
A2. 
 
The effect of the incentive to match is positive and significantly different from zero on average 
and for both husband evaluators and wife evaluators when evaluating wives’ actions after 
controlling for the characteristics of the action being evaluated and whether the evaluator lives 
in a patrilineal community. The effect of the incentive to match is positive but not significantly 
different from zero for both husband evaluators and wife evaluators when evaluating husbands’ 
actions after controlling for the characteristics of the action being evaluated and whether the 
evaluator lives in a patrilineal community. Adding village fixed effects leaves the results reported 
above qualitatively unchanged.  
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Figure A1: The distributions of self-relevant prescriptions and inter-
spousal prescription differences across DMs 
  
Source: authors’ data   
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Table A3: Regression analysis of Allocation Task decisions including 
behavioural prescriptions 
Dependent variable = 1 if allocated to self in Allocation Task 
  Model 2 (from Table A1)  Model 3 
  Low   
deniability 
High  
deniability 
 Low   
deniability 
High  
deniability 
Constant  0.590*** 0.570***  0.595*** 0.568*** 
  (0.080) (0.084)  (0.068) (0.073) 
DM=wife (dmw)  0.019 0.130***  -0.002 0.093** 
  (0.044) (0.042)  (0.041) (0.041) 
Self-relevant prescription   0.077** 0.082*** 
     (0.034) (0.026) 
Inter-spousal prescription difference   0.038** 2.5e-4 
     (0.018) (0.016) 
DM=wife (dmw)  0.019 0.130***  -0.002 0.093** 
  (0.044) (0.042)  (0.041) (0.041) 
AT decision fes  yes  Yes 
Village fes  yes  Yes 
Script reader fes  yes  Yes 
Observations  3,861  3,850 
R-squared  0.172  0.195 
Notes: Marginal effects from two LPM estimations presented; an observation is a decision in the Allocation Task; 
each participant made 11 decisions; 11 observations are lost between Models 2 and 3 owing to the departure 
of one wife after she had engaged in the AT but before she had engaged in ET1; standard errors adjusted for 
non-independence within sessions (44) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: authors’ data 
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Table A4: Regression analysis of ET2: Is saving and keeping it secret 
from spouse less appropriate than other options?  
Dependent variable = evaluation (very appropriate (1.00), somewhat appropriate (0.33),       
somewhat inappropriate (-0.33), very inappropriate (-1.00)) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  All 
evaluations  
 Husbands 
evaluating 
husbands 
Husbands 
evaluating 
wives 
Wives 
evaluating 
husbands 
Wives 
evaluating 
wives 
Incentive to match absent        
    Constant  0.600***  0.586*** 0.545*** 0.805*** 0.467*** 
  (0.039)  (0.041) (0.079) (0.025) (0.097) 
    Save and keep secret   -1.111***  -1.172*** a -0.985*** b -1.563*** ac -0.729*** bc 
  (0.080)  (0.064) (0.137) (0.076) (0.200) 
Observations  2,808  2,808 
R-squared  0.362  0.390 
Incentive to match in place        
  Constant  0.583***  0.615*** 0.465*** 0.799*** 0.455*** 
  (0.038)  (0.031) (0.078) (0.030) (0.031) 
  Save and keep secret   -1.132***  -1.188*** a -0.947*** b -1.633*** ac -1.132*** bc 
  (0.085)  (0.071) (0.146) (0.053) (0.218) 
  Observations  2,808  2,808 
  R-squared  0.367  0.399 
Notes: An observation is an evaluator 𝑖 evaluating an options faced by a decision-maker of type 𝑗; coefficients 
from linear regressions presented; basis for comparison = non-saving and save and tell spouse options; 
coefficients from linear regressions presented; standard errors adjusted for non-independence within 
sessions (88) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; a diff. in marginal effect between husbands 
evaluating husbands and wives evaluating husbands sig at p<0.001; b diff. in marginal effect between 
husbands evaluating wives and wives evaluating wives sig at p<0.001; c diff. in marginal effect between wives 
evaluating husbands and wives evaluating wives sig at p<0.001.  
Source: authors’ data 
 
The specification of Model 1 is as follows: 
𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑣 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑣 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑣 
where: 
 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑣             = 𝑖’s evaluation of DM 𝑗 taking option 𝑣; 
𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑣    = 1 if 𝑗 hides cash at home and does not tell spouse, saves in an e-wallet and does not 
tell spouse, or joins a savings group and does not tell spouse; = 0 if 𝑗 takes any of 
the other five options; and 
 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑣                    = the error term. 
 
The specification of Model 2 is as follows: 
 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑣 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑣 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗 
                                  +𝛽5(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡)𝑖𝑣 + 𝛽5(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑑𝑚𝑤)𝑖𝑗  
                                                 +𝛽6(𝑑𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡)𝑗𝑣 + 𝛽7(𝑑𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡)𝑖𝑗𝑣 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑣 
where: 
 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑖                 = 1 if evaluator 𝑖 is a wife; = 0 if evaluator 𝑖 is a husband; and 
 𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗                 = 1 if decision-maker 𝑗, whose actions are being evaluated, is a wife; = 0 if 𝑗 is a 
husband. 
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Table A5: Regression analysis of ET2: Is saving and telling spouse 
more appropriate than other options?  
Dependent variable = evaluation (very appropriate (1.00), somewhat appropriate (0.33),       
somewhat inappropriate (-0.33), very inappropriate (-1.00)) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  All 
evaluations  
 Husbands 
evaluating 
husbands 
Husbands 
evaluating 
wives 
Wives 
evaluating 
husbands 
Wives 
evaluating 
wives 
Incentive to match absent        
    Constant  -0.066**  -0.041 -0.044 -0.159*** -0.023 
  (0.032)  (0.045) (0.066) (0.044) (0.082) 
    Save and tell spouse   0.667***  0.501*** a 0.587*** 1.008*** a 0.576***  
  (0.063)  (0.050) (0.112) (0.070) (0.173) 
Observations  2,808  2,808 
R-squared  0.131  0.143 
Incentive to match in place        
  Constant  -0.099***  -0.024 -0.080 -0.218*** -0.074 
  (0.036)  (0.054) (0.056) (0.040) (0.105) 
  Save and tell spouse   0.686***  0.517*** a 0.507*** 1.080*** a 0.645***  
  (0.070)  (0.062) (0.122) (0.050) (0.192) 
  Observations  2,808  2,808 
  R-squared  0.135  0.152 
Notes: An observation is an evaluator 𝑖 evaluating an options faced by a decision-maker of type 𝑗; 
coefficients from linear regressions presented; basis for comparison = non-saving and save and keep secret 
options; standard errors adjusted for non-independence within sessions (88) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1; a diff. in marginal effect between husbands evaluating husbands and wives evaluating 
husbands sig at p<0.001. 
Source: authors’ data 
 
The specification of Model 1 is as follows: 
𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑣 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑣 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑣 
where: 
 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑣             = 𝑖’s evaluation of DM 𝑗 taking option 𝑣; 
𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑣    = 1 if 𝑗 hides cash at home and does not tell spouse, saves in an e-wallet and does not 
tell spouse, or joins a savings group and does not tell spouse; = 0 if 𝑗 takes any of 
the other five options; and 
 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑣                    = the error term. 
 
The specification of Model 2 is as follows: 
 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑣 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑣 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗 
                                  +𝛽5(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑙)𝑖𝑣 + 𝛽5(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑑𝑚𝑤)𝑖𝑗  
                                                 +𝛽6(𝑑𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑙)𝑗𝑣 + 𝛽7(𝑑𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑙)𝑖𝑗𝑣 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑣 
where: 
 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑖                 = 1 if evaluator 𝑖 is a wife; = 0 if evaluator 𝑖 is a husband; and 
 𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗                 = 1 if decision-maker 𝑗, whose actions are being evaluated, is a wife; = 0 if 𝑗 is a 
husband. 
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Table A6: Regression analysis of ET2: Appropriateness of different 
types of saving  
Dependent variable = evaluation (very appropriate (1.00), somewhat appropriate (0.33),       
somewhat inappropriate (-0.33), very inappropriate (-1.00)) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  All 
evaluations  
 Husbands 
evaluating 
husbands 
Husbands 
evaluating 
wives 
Wives 
evaluating 
husbands 
Wives 
evaluating 
wives 
Incentive to match absent        
    Constant  0.299***  -0.015 0.174 0.747*** 0.295* 
  (0.079)  (0.121) (0.154) (0.070) (0.164) 
    Ewallet  0.353***  0.523** 0.432*** 0.130* 0.326** 
  (0.076)  (0.204) (0.136) (0.076) (0.134) 
    Savings group  0.551***  0.902*** 0.674*** 0.176** 0.447*** 
      (0.072)  (0.112) (0.139) (0.079) (0.135) 
    H0: coeff on Ewallet = 
            coeff on Savings group 
 
p<0.001  p=0.003 p=0.076 p=0.009 p=0.057 
   Observations  1,053  1,053 
   R-squared  0.105  0.173 
Incentive to match in place        
    Constant  0.345***  0.136 0.030 0.808*** 0.409*** 
  (0.078)  (0.121) (0.155) (0.063) (0.146) 
    Ewallet  0.251***  0.348 0.379** 0.077 0.197* 
  (0.077)  (0.209) (0.177) (0.060) (0.104) 
    Savings group  0.477***  0.720*** 0.811*** 0.084 0.288** 
      (0.075)  (0.127) (0.145) (0.059) (0.126) 
    H0: coeff on Ewallet = 
            coeff on Savings group 
 
p<0.001  p=0.006 p=0.007 p=0.710 p=0.112 
    Observations  1,053  1,053 
    R-squared  0.076  0.162 
Notes: An observation is an evaluator 𝑖 evaluating an options faced by a decision-maker of type 𝑗; sample 
restricted to saving and telling spouse options; coefficients from linear regressions presented; basis for 
comparison = hide cash at home; standard errors adjusted for non-independence within sessions (88) in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: authors’ data 
 
The specification of Model 1 is as follows: 
𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑣 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑣 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑣𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑣 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑣 
where: 
 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑣             = 𝑖’s evaluation of DM 𝑗 taking option 𝑣; 
𝐸𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑣    = 1 if 𝑗 saves in an e-wallet; = 0 if 𝑗 hides cash at home or joins a savings group;  
𝑆𝑎𝑣𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑣    = 1 if 𝑗 joins a savings group; = 0 if 𝑗 hides cash at home or saves in an e-wallet; and 
 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑣                    = the error term. 
The specification of Model 2 is as follows: 
 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑣 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑣 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑣𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑣 + 𝛽3𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗 + 𝛽5(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝐸𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑡)𝑖𝑣 
                                       +𝛽6(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝐺𝑟𝑝)𝑖𝑣 + 𝛽7(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑑𝑚𝑤)𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8(𝑑𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝐸𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑡)𝑗𝑣 
                                                      +𝛽9(𝑑𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝐺𝑟𝑝)𝑗𝑣 + 𝛽10(𝑑𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝐸𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑡)𝑖𝑗𝑣 
                                                                             +𝛽11(𝑑𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝐺𝑟𝑝)𝑖𝑗𝑣 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑣 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑖 and 𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗 are defined as before. 
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Table A7: Analysis of within-session variation in ET2 evaluations  
Dependent variable = SD = the within session standard deviation in an evaluation of a specific option   
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Husbands Husbands Wives Wives 
  evaluating evaluating evaluating evaluating 
  husbands wives husbands wives 
Constant 0.524*** 0.457*** 0.591*** 0.595*** 0.658*** 
 (0.026) (0.080) (0.069) (0.078) (0.083) 
Incentive to match (IM) 0.007 0.013 -0.002 0.003 0.014 
 (0.015) (0.029) (0.035) (0.032) (0.031) 
Patrilineal (PL)  -0.059 -0.059 -0.031 -0.031 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.035) (0.035) 
To spouse (TS)  -0.115 -0.116 -0.426*** 0.103 
  (0.090) (0.102) (0.098) (0.070) 
Hide at home (HH)  0.330*** 0.053 -0.245** 0.000 
  (0.088) (0.064) (0.096) (0.065) 
Mobile money (MM)  0.151 -0.096 -0.387*** -0.146 
  (0.162) (0.125) (0.096) (0.100) 
Savings group (SG)  -0.137 -0.266** -0.430*** -0.240* 
  (0.104) (0.116) (0.092) (0.135) 
Keep saving secret (S)  -0.118 -0.047 -0.078 0.053 
  (0.078) (0.118) (0.131) (0.111) 
MM x S  0.161 0.212* 0.141** 0.130 
  (0.114) (0.124) (0.067) (0.090) 
SG x S  0.436*** 0.389*** 0.263** 0.270** 
  (0.057) (0.144) (0.119) (0.100) 
Experimental controls no Yes 
Observations 704 704 
R-squared <0.001 0.314 
Notes: An observation is an evaluation by all the participants in a session; Basis for comparison = treats for family; 
Experimental controls = a dummy indicating that 7 (not 8) spouses in the session, a dummy indicating that the 
order of the possible actions was reversed and the latter interacted with gender of evaluator and evaluated; 
robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: authors’ data 
 
The specification of model 2 is as follows: 
𝑆𝐷𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑀𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑃𝐿𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑇𝑆𝑗 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑇𝑗 + 𝛼5𝑀𝑀𝑗 + 𝛼6𝑆𝐺𝑗 + 𝛼7𝑆𝑗 + 𝛼8(𝑀𝑀 × 𝑆)𝑗 + 𝛼9(𝑆𝐺 × 𝑆)𝑗  
      +𝛽0𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽1(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐼𝑀)𝑗 + 𝛽2(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑃𝐿)𝑗 + 𝛽3(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑇𝑆)𝑗 + 𝛽4(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐹𝑇)𝑗 
        +𝛽5(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑀𝑀)𝑗 + 𝛽6(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑆𝐺)𝑗 + 𝛽7(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑆)𝑗 + 𝛽8(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑀𝑀 × 𝑆)𝑗 
          +𝛽9(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑆𝐺 × 𝑆)𝑗 + 𝛾0𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗 + 𝛾1(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝐼𝑀)𝑗 + 𝛾2(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑃𝐿)𝑗 + 𝛾3(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑇𝑆)𝑗 
            +𝛾4(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝐹𝑇)𝑗 + 𝛾5(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑀𝑀)𝑗 + 𝛾6(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑆𝐺)𝑗 + 𝛾7(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑆)𝑗 + 𝛾8(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑀𝑀 × 𝑆)𝑗 
              +𝛾9(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑆𝐺 × 𝑆)𝑗 + 𝛿0(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒)𝑗 + 𝛿1(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐼𝑀)𝑗 + 𝛿2(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑃𝐿)𝑗 
                +𝛿3(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑇𝑆)𝑗 + 𝛿4(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐹𝑇)𝑗 + 𝛿5(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑀𝑀)𝑗 
                  +𝛿6(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑆𝐺)𝑗 + 𝛿7(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑆)𝑗 + 𝛿8(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑀𝑀 × 𝑆)𝑗 
                      +𝛿9(𝑑𝑚𝑤 × 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑆𝐺 × 𝑆)𝑗 + 𝑪𝜽 + 𝑢𝑗         
where: 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑗 = 1 if evaluator is a wife; 𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗 = 1 if a wife is being evaluated; 𝑪 is a vector of 
experimental controls (see note for Table ?? for details); 𝑢𝑗 is the error term; and the other variables 
are as defined in Table ??. 
 
The effect of the incentive to coordinate is insignificantly different from zero on average and for 
each possible evaluator-type-decision-maker-type combination both before (not shown) and after 
controlling for the characteristics of the evaluated option and whether evaluator lives in a patrilineal 
or matrilineal community. Adding village fixed effects leaves results qualitatively unchanged.  
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Table A8: Analysis of within-session variation in ET3 evaluations 
Dependent variable = SD = the within session standard deviation in an evaluation of a specific option   
  Model 1  Model 2 
VARIABLES    Husbands  
evaluating 
Wives    
evaluating 
Constant  0.341***  0.329***a 0.426***a 
  (0.019)  (0.039) (0.028) 
Incentive to match (IM)  0.045***  0.074***a 0.016a 
  (0.014)  (0.023) (0.012) 
Patrilineal (PL)  -  -0.075*a 0.047a 
    (0.043) (0.038) 
BurnFood  -  -0.041** -0.056** 
    (0.019) (0.028) 
Argue  -  -0.025a -0.124***a 
    (0.033) (0.034) 
VisitFamFrnd  -  0.028 0.006 
    (0.033) (0.022) 
RefuseSex  -  -0.065** -0.048 
    (0.027) (0.034) 
Ewallet  -  0.005 -0.051 
    (0.035) (0.036) 
SavGrp  -  0.015 -0.073* 
    (0.041) (0.037) 
Observations  616  616 
R-squared  0.016  0.168 
Notes: An observation is an evaluation by all the participants in a session; Basis for comparison = Wife 
neglects the children; Experimental controls = a dummy indicating that 7 (not 8) spouses participated in 
the session; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: authors’ data 
 
The specification of Model 2 is as follows:  
 
 𝑆𝐷𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑀𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑃𝐿𝑗 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑛𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑗 + 𝛼4𝐴𝑟𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑗 + 𝛼5𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑗 + 𝛼6𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑗  
                   +𝛼7𝐸𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑗 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑎𝑣𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑗 + 𝛽0𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽1(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐼𝑀)𝑗 + 𝛽2(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑃𝐿)𝑗  
                           +𝛽3(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑛𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑)𝑗 + 𝛽4(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐴𝑟𝑔𝑢𝑒)𝑗 + 𝛽5(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑟𝑛𝑑)𝑗  
                                    +𝛽6(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑥)𝑗 + 𝛽5(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝐸𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑡)𝑗 + 𝛽5(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 × 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝐺𝑟𝑝)𝑗 + 𝑪𝜽 + 𝑢𝑗 
 
where: 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑗 = 1 if evaluators were wives and zero otherwise; 𝑪 is a vector of experimental 
controls (see table note for details); 𝑢𝑗  is the error term; and the other variables are as defined 
in the Table. 
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Table A9: Analysis of ET3 evaluations made in the absence of       
the incentive to match 
Dependent variable = Just = 1 if evaluator responded that wife beating was justified   
  H0: coeff on variable in row = coeff on… 
 Model Ewallet SavGrp 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.160***   
 (0.027)   
Wife 0.148***   
 (0.028)   
Patrilineal -0.021   
 (0.028)   
BrnFood -0.048** 0.049** 0.084* 
 (0.024)   
Argue -0.060** 0.046** 0.048** 
 (0.028)   
VisitFamFrnd 0.054** 0.172 0.140 
 (0.025)   
RefuseSex -0.031 0.176 0.221 
 (0.024)   
Ewallet 0.011  0.803 
 (0.031)   
SavGrp 0.006 0.803  
 (0.030)   
Individual fes yes   
Observations 2,457   
R-squared 0.043   
Notes: An observation is an evaluator 𝑖 responding to one of the ET3 questions; sample restricted 
to responses given in absence of incentive to match; coefficients from one linear probability 
presented in column (1); standard errors adjusted for non-independence within sessions (88) in 
parentheses; basis for comparison = wife neglects children; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; column 
(2) presents results (p-values) of tests of equivalence between coefficient on Ewallet and 
coefficients on each of the other scenario identifiers; column (3) presents results (p-values) of tests 
of equivalence between coefficient on SavGrp and coefficients on each of the other scenario 
identifiers. 
Source: authors’ data 
 
The specification of the model in column (1) is as follows:  
 
 𝐽𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑛𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑟𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐹𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑗  
                                                                              +𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑥𝑗 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑗 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑎𝑣𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗 
 
where: 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑖 = 1 if evaluator was a wife and zero otherwise; 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 = 1 if evaluator 
lived in a patrilineal community and zero otherwises; 𝑢𝑖𝑗 is the error term; and the other 
variables identify the scenario 𝑗. 
 
When added to this model, a set of six interaction terms, each involving 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 and one of the 
scenario identifiers, is jointly insignificant (p=0.276).   
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Table A10: Regression analysis of ET2: For whom is giving cash to 
the spouse more appropriate than other options?  
Dependent variable = evaluation (very appropriate (1.00), somewhat appropriate (0.33),       
somewhat inappropriate (-0.33), very inappropriate (-1.00)) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  All 
evaluations  
 Husbands 
evaluating 
husbands 
Husbands 
evaluating 
wives 
Wives 
evaluating 
husbands 
Wives 
evaluating 
wives 
Incentive to match absent        
    Constant  0.124***  0.047 0.132** 0.119*** 0.198*** 
  (0.025)  (0.042) (0.059) (0.031) (0.052) 
    Give cash to spouse   0.479***  0.802*** a  0.353** ab 0.805*** c -0.039 bc 
  (0.077)  (0.046) (0.154) (0.058) (0.141) 
Observations  2,808  2,808 
R-squared  0.031  0.049 
Incentive to match in place        
  Constant  0.102***  0.071 0.058 0.087*** 0.192*** 
  (0.024)  (0.044) (0.046) (0.030) (0.053) 
  Give cash to spouse   0.450***  0.785***a’ 0.411**a’b’ 0.798*** c’ -0.192 b’c’ 
  (0.084)  (0.059) (0.166) (0.031) (0.147) 
  Observations  2,808  2,808 
  R-squared  0.027  0.050 
Notes: An observation is an evaluator 𝑖 evaluating an options faced by a decision-maker of type 𝑗; 
coefficients from linear regressions presented; basis for comparison = non-saving and save and keep secret 
options; standard errors adjusted for non-independence within sessions (88) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1; a diff. in marginal effect between husbands evaluating husbands and husbands evaluating 
wives sig at p=0.008 (a’ diff. sig at p=0.04); b diff. in marginal effect between husbands evaluating wives and 
wives evaluating wives sig at p=0.067 (b’ diff. sig at p=0.009); c diff. in marginal effect between wives 
evaluating husbands and wives evaluating wives sig at p<0.001 (c’ diff. sig at p<0.10). 
Source: authors’ data 
 
The specification of Model 1 is as follows: 
𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑣 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑣 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑣 
where: 
 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑣             = 𝑖’s evaluation of DM 𝑗 taking option 𝑣; 
𝑡𝑜𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑣    = 1 if 𝑗 gives cash to spouse; = 0 if 𝑗 takes any of the other seven options; and 
 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑣                    = the error term. 
 
The specification of Model 2 is as follows: 
 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑣 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗 
                                  +𝛽5(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒)𝑖𝑣 + 𝛽5(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑑𝑚𝑤)𝑖𝑗  
                                                 +𝛽6(𝑑𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒)𝑗𝑣 + 𝛽7(𝑑𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒)𝑖𝑗𝑣 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑣 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑖 and  𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗 are defined as above. 
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Table A11: Regression analysis of relative evaluations of allocating 
to self in the AT when the incentive to match is not in place 
Dependent variable = evaluation of to-self - evaluation of to-spouse 
  Model 1  Model 2 
    Engaged in AT          
prior to ET1 
Did not                  
engage in AT 
Constant  0.059  0.057 0.061 
  (0.068)  (0.082) (0.108) 
Wife  -0.190*  -0.015 -0.365** 
  (0.102)  (0.119) (0.158) 
Dmw  0.027  0.008 0.045 
  (0.080)  (0.095) (0.129) 
wife*dmw  0.779***  0.415*** 1.143*** 
  (0.145)  (0.143) (0.224) 
D35:45  -0.455***  -0.453*** -0.453*** 
  (0.102)  (0.080) (0.080) 
wife*D35:45  0.196  0.021 0.021 
  (0.151)  (0.138) (0.138) 
dmw*D35:45  0.121  0.140 0.140 
  (0.125)  (0.114) (0.114) 
wife*dmw* D35:45  -0.673***  0.057 0.061 
  (0.185)  (0.082) (0.108) 
Observations  2,100  2,100 
R-squared  0.083  0.093 
Notes: An observation is an evaluator 𝑖 evaluating the options faced by a decision-maker of type 𝑗 when facing 
decision 𝑑; coefficients from linear regressions presented; standard errors adjusted for non-independence 
within sessions (88) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: authors’ data 
 
The specification of Model 1 is as follows: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑑 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗 + 𝛽3(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑑𝑚𝑤)𝑖𝑗  
                                 +𝛽4𝐷35: 45𝑑 + 𝛽5(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝐷35: 45)𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽6(𝑑𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝐷35: 45)𝑗𝑑 
                                                                                                    +𝛽7(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑑𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝐷35: 45)𝑖𝑗𝑑 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑑 
where: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑑      = 𝑖’s relative evaluation of DM 𝑗 allocating to self instead of to spouse in decision 𝑑; 
 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑖            = 1 if evaluator 𝑖 is a wife; = 0 if evaluator 𝑖 is a husband; 
 𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗           = 1 if decision-maker 𝑗, whose actions are being evaluated, is a wife; = 0 if 𝑗 is a husband; 
 𝐷35: 45𝑑    = 1 if 𝑗 is facing AT decision 35:45; = 0 if 𝑗 is facing AT decision 45:45; and 
 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑑               = the error term. 
Including evaluator fixed effects in the estimation of Model 1 yields almost identical estimates of 𝛽2 
to 𝛽7 and almost identical corresponding standard error estimates. Estimating Model 1 using the 
evaluations made when the incentive to match was in place yields qualitatively similar results.  
 
The specification of Model 2 is as follows:  
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑑 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑚𝑤𝑗 + 𝛽3(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑑𝑚𝑤)𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐷35: 45𝑑 + 𝛽5(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝐷35: 45)𝑖𝑑 
                          +𝛽6(𝑑𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝐷35: 45)𝑗𝑑 + 𝛽7(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑑𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝐷35: 45)𝑖𝑗𝑑 
                              +𝛾0𝐴𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾1(𝐴𝑇 ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛾2(𝐴𝑇 ∗ 𝑑𝑚𝑤)𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾3(𝐴𝑇 ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 ∗ 𝑑𝑚𝑤)𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑑 
where 𝐴𝑇𝑖 = 1 if evaluator 𝑖 engaged in the AT prior to ET1 and = 0 if 𝑖 did not engage in the AT.  
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Figure A2: Relative evaluations of actions in AT decision 45:45, 
distinguishing between DM and PS spouses 
  
Note: This figure is derived from Model 2, Table A11. 
Source: authors’ data  
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Table A12: Regression analysis of ET2: Differential appropriateness 
of saving and keeping it secret in Matrilineal and Patrilineal 
communities  
Dependent variable = evaluation (very appropriate (1.00), somewhat appropriate (0.33),                             
somewhat inappropriate (-0.33), very inappropriate (-1.00)) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  All 
evaluations  
 Husbands 
evaluating 
husbands 
Husbands 
evaluating 
wives 
Wives 
evaluating 
husbands 
Wives 
evaluating 
wives 
Matrilineal        
    Constant  0.644***  0.656*** 0.617*** 0.764*** 0.513*** 
  (0.031)  (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.081) 
    Save and keep secret   -1.216***  -1.068***a -1.122*** -1.560***b -1.074*** 
  (0.069)  (0.093) (0.161) (0.082) (0.055) 
Patrilineal        
  Constant  0.522***  0.567*** 0.339*** 0.843*** 0.406*** 
  (0.067)  (0.045) (0.117) (0.042) (0.144) 
  Save and keep secret   -1.048***  -1.333***a -0.802*** -1.723***b -0.507 
  (0.154)  (0.065) (0.214) (0.033) (0.365) 
  Observations  2,808  2,808 
  R-squared  0.371  0.413 
Notes: An observation is an evaluator 𝑖 evaluating an options faced by a decision-maker of type 𝑗; coefficients 
from linear regressions presented; basis for comparison = non-saving and save and tell spouse options; 
coefficients from linear regressions presented; standard errors adjusted for non-independence within 
sessions (88) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; a diff. in marginal effect between evaluations 
made by members of matrilineal and patrilineal communities sig at p=0.024; b diff. in marginal effect between 
evaluations made by members of matrilineal and patrilineal communities sig at p=0.072.  
Source: authors’ data 
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Table A13: Regression analysis of ET2: Differential appropriateness 
of saving and telling spouse in Matrilineal and Patrilineal 
communities  
Dependent variable = evaluation (very appropriate (1.00), somewhat appropriate (0.33),                             
somewhat inappropriate (-0.33), very inappropriate (-1.00)) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  All 
evaluations  
 Husbands 
evaluating 
husbands 
Husbands 
evaluating 
wives 
Wives 
evaluating 
husbands 
Wives 
evaluating 
wives 
Matrilineal        
    Constant  -0.092*  0.078 -0.050 -0.197*** -0.210** 
  (0.047)  (0.069) (0.097) (0.059) (0.094) 
    Save and tell spouse   0.746***  0.473*** 0.656*** 1.003***a 0.854*** 
  (0.066)  (0.087) (0.151) (0.071) (0.077) 
Patrilineal        
  Constant  -0.106*  -0.147*** -0.106 -0.244*** 0.039 
  (0.054)  (0.042) (0.063) (0.050) (0.162) 
  Save and tell spouse  0.626***  0.569*** 0.383** 1.176***a 0.470 
  (0.122)  (0.082) (0.169) (0.036) (0.330) 
  Observations  2,808  2,808 
  R-squared  0.137  0.162 
Notes: An observation is an evaluator 𝑖 evaluating an options faced by a decision-maker of type 𝑗; coefficients 
from linear regressions presented; basis for comparison = non-saving and save and tell spouse options; 
coefficients from linear regressions presented; standard errors adjusted for non-independence within 
sessions (88) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; a diff. in marginal effect between evaluations 
made by members of matrilineal and patrilineal communities sig at p=0.035.  
Source: authors’ data 
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Table A14: Regression analysis of ET2: Appropriateness of giving 
cash to spouse in Matrilineal and Patrilineal communities 
Dependent variable = evaluation (very appropriate (1.00), somewhat appropriate (0.33),                          
somewhat inappropriate (-0.33), very inappropriate (-1.00)) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  All 
evaluations  
 Husbands 
evaluating 
husbands 
Husbands 
evaluating 
wives 
Wives 
evaluating 
husbands 
Wives 
evaluating 
wives 
Matrilineal        
    Constant  0.119***  0.169*** 0.117 0.081* 0.107 
  (0.030)  (0.046) (0.075) (0.044) (0.073) 
    Give cash to spouse   0.551***  0.692***a 0.633*** 0.780*** 0.026 
  (0.082)  (0.091) (0.192) (0.052) (0.052) 
Patrilineal        
  Constant  0.085**  -0.045 0.010 0.094** 0.262*** 
  (0.036)  (0.037) (0.048) (0.039) (0.064) 
  Give cash to spouse   0.347**  0.895***a 0.226 0.821*** -0.373 
  (0.144)  (0.059) (0.166) (0.031) (0.147) 
  Observations  2,808  2,808 
  R-squared  0.030  0.058 
Notes: An observation is an evaluator 𝑖 evaluating an options faced by a decision-maker of type 𝑗; coefficients 
from linear regressions presented; basis for comparison = non-saving and save and keep secret options; 
standard errors adjusted for non-independence within sessions (88) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1; a diff. in marginal effects between matrilineal and patrilineal communities sig at p=0.035. 
Source: authors’ data 
 
 
